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Reciprocity is central to our understanding of politics. Most political
exchanges—whether they involve legislative vote trading, inter-
branch bargaining, constituent service, or even the corrupt ex-
change of public resources for private wealth—require reciprocity.
But how does reciprocity arise? Do government officials learn rec-
iprocity while holding office, or do recruitment and selection prac-
tices favor those who already adhere to a norm of reciprocity? We
recruit Zambian politicians who narrowly won or lost a previous
election to play behavioral games that provide a measure of rec-
iprocity. This combination of regression discontinuity and experi-
mental designs allows us to estimate the effect of holding office
on behavior. We find that holding office increases adherence to
the norm of reciprocity. This study identifies causal effects of hold-
ing office on politicians’ behavior.
regression discontinuity | behavioral games | reciprocity |
legislative bargaining | corruption
Reciprocity, the voluntary requital of benefit for benefit, iscentral to our understanding of politics.* From passing laws
in legislatures (1, 2, 10–24) to buying votes and favors (3, 25–35)
to reinforcing international agreements (36–42), those in politi-
cal office frequently engage in the alternating provision of ben-
efits. Theories of reciprocity in politics have their origins in social
choice theory. Seeking to reconcile theoretical predictions of
legislative coalition size and instability (43, 44) with relatively
stable empirical realities (45), political scientists began to consider
reciprocity as an intervening variable. The exchange of favors in
a legislature, often called logrolling, is a common form of reciprocity
that facilitates and stabilizes policymaking (10–17). Reciprocity also
may discourage majority parties from passing rules that reduce the
power of the minority, because in the future, their positions may be
reversed (2, 18–22). Lobbyists rely on norms of reciprocity when
negotiating policies with legislators (23, 24). Reciprocity plays a role
in politics outside of lawmaking as well. International trade agree-
ments, laws, and peace treaties rely on reciprocity (36–42). Demo-
cratic representation is a form of reciprocity, in which voters elect
candidates and expect certain goods, services, or policies in exchange
(3, 25–27). Corrupt exchanges too—especially those that occur over
a period or may require repeat interaction—often rely on reciprocity
(28–35). Cooperation rooted in reciprocity is fundamental to many
aspects of political office.
However, the root cause of reciprocity among office holders is
unclear to both scholars and policymakers (46). Does holding office
cultivate reciprocity? Or do only highly reciprocating individuals
choose to run for office? Understanding the origins of reciprocity is
valuable for those who wish to channel its applications. From a
policy standpoint, showing that institutions and cultural norms as-
sociated with holding office affect reciprocity would focus attention
on institutional design or cultural interventions to affect political
outcomes. However, revealing that behavioral traits, such as reci-
procity, are immutable and innate would shift focus toward refining
selection mechanisms for those that seek and obtain elected office.
Identifying causality in the relationship between holding office
and politician behavior is precluded by two significant obstacles to
obtaining valid counterfactual data for the “treatment” of holding
office. First, a researcher must find a comparison group composed
of individuals identical to office holders, except for not holding
office. Because experimentally manipulating access to political of-
fice is challenging, current studies are unable to compare a group
treated with office holding with a probabilistically equivalent un-
treated group. [There is an extensive experimental literature in
psychology documenting the behavioral effects of power, but ex-
perimental treatments in this literature do not explicitly address the
phenomena of political power and holding office (47–49).] Second,
even if a valid comparison group can be found, nonoffice holders
may not face the same situations as office holders—such as nego-
tiating policies or exchanging bribes—thus preventing a comparison
of the two groups on the same outcome variable.
In this project, we combat these identification challenges with
a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to ensure that we have
equivalent groups of office holders and nonoffice holders. We
use the discontinuity at the electoral margin as an assignment
mechanism for the treatment of holding office. We recruited
politicians who narrowly won or lost a recent election in Zambia
and asked them to make strategic decisions in a sequence of
economic games designed to measure reciprocity. We find that
office holders display significantly higher levels of reciprocity
than nonoffice holders. This study identifies a causal effect of
holding political office on individual behavior, a valuable contri-
bution to understanding the influence of institutions on politician
behavior and the genesis of the reciprocal behavior so funda-
mental to politics. By recruiting standing elected officials to play
behavioral games, this study also relates to a growing body of
research involving political elites as experimental subjects (50–52).
Significance
Does being elected to political office change an individual’s
behavior? Some scholars and policymakers assert that elected
officials are inherently different from nonpoliticians, whereas
others argue that political institutions or the culture of politics
inculcate certain behaviors. We identify the effect of holding
office on behavior. We recruit in-office and out-of-office poli-
ticians in Zambia to participate in behavioral games that
measure reciprocity, a behavioral trait that underpins various
interactions in the political arena from bribery to lobbying to
legislative bargaining. We find that holding elected office
causes an increase in reciprocity. The policy implication of this
finding is that political institutions, culture, and incentive
structures can be designed to shape the behavior and choices
of society’s leaders.
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*Our definition (and experimental measure) aligns with extant literature on reciprocity in
politics (1–3). Some scholars distinguish between intrinsic or generalized reciprocity (the
habitual practice of repaying kindness with kindness) and instrumental or direct reci-
procity (which occurs in a particular exchange with a particular partner) (4–8). Because
our measure of reciprocity is based on a one-shot anonymous interaction, it measures
intrinsic reciprocity rather than instrumental, consistent with existing experimental find-
ings that a repeat interaction is not required to activate the norm of reciprocity (9).
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Theory and Hypotheses
The Connection Between Holding Office and Reciprocity. The expe-
rience of holding political office may affect a range of behaviors,
but this article focuses on reciprocity. Reciprocity underlies
many systems of exchange for mutual advantage. In politics, the
partners in these reciprocal exchanges can be office holders,
bureaucrats, nongovernmental actors, and citizens. For example,
electoral representation, clientelism, patronage, and lobbying are
all forms of reciprocity between political elites and citizens.
Treaty law, federal grants, party organization, and logrolling are
all forms of reciprocity exclusively among elites.
Office holders should be more likely to reciprocate than their
nonoffice-holding counterparts, because their experience in office
acculturates them to norms of reciprocity. Research in sociology
and political science finds that, by holding office, a legislator is ex-
posed to norms and learns to follow them (46, 53). Indeed, legis-
lative bodies are designed to foster such norms (19, 22). Reciprocity
is particularly important in weakly institutionalized emerging de-
mocracies, such as Zambia. Lacking the formal rules that allow
citizens and their representatives to monitor and sanction elected
officials, informal institutions and norms are a crucial determinant
of political behavior (54, 55). Finally, in the Zambian context, the
quid pro quo of reciprocity could certainly augment the income of a
district councilor, which is an unpaid position (56).
Office holders are especially likely to rely on reciprocity in low-
information environments. Office holders frequently must cut deals
with individuals outside their community or even complete strang-
ers. By contrast, those who do not hold office—especially in less
developed, more rural states, such as Zambia—do most of their
exchange within a community of relatively well-known neighbors.
Interviews with Zambian elected officials and policymakers—
including district councilors, members of the National Assembly,
and the government’s Office of the Auditor General—support the
notion that holding the office of district councilor could foster a
norm of reciprocity. Respondents suggested three reasons that
holding the office of district councilor might increase reciprocity
levels: party discipline, political culture, and income. First, party
leaders use discipline (the practice of reward and punishment) to
enforce and even exploit a reciprocity norm among those in office
to pass preferred policies, maintain the status quo political system,
and garner support for the next election. Second, political culture
includes practices, such as legislative favor trading and pork-barrel
politics, which encourage newly elected councilors to embrace
reciprocal behavior as a necessary to their profession. Third, some
district councilors may turn to corrupt favor trading to supplement
their income, which our subjects self-reported as averaging around
US$100 per month. (Exploring these three potential mechanisms
by which institutions influence behavior is an avenue for future
research.)
The literature on reciprocity in politics and our interviews with
politicians support the hypothesis that the treatment of holding
office increases reciprocity at the individual level.†
Of course, the treatment of holding office is multifaceted, and
our study is not designed to identify which component of office
holding is most important for cultivating reciprocity. Although it
is conceivable that losing an election is part of the treatment that
differentially influences the behavior of winners and losers, we
do not believe that this is a factor in our study. Aside from
electoral defeat itself, there is no shared experience of election
losers; whereas office holders conduct council meetings, hire and
fire staff, make policy decisions, and attend national conferences
and workshops, election losers do not gather together or par-
ticipate in any institutions. Neither the academic literature nor
our interviews with Zambian officials suggest that election losers
might systematically and differentially develop new norms of
behavior.
Measuring Reciprocity. We use costly choices in behavioral games
to measure reciprocity among political officials. Specifically, to
disentangle reciprocity from alternative other-regarding prefer-
ences, we used three strategic decision tasks set within the Trust
Game and Dictator Game. A substantial literature in the be-
havioral sciences suggests that the experimental tasks in which
our subjects engage are reliable, if sometimes noisy, indicators of
fundamental behavioral tendencies. Behavior in the Trust and
Dictator Games is used to explain human behavior in the fields
of psychology (59–62), anthropology (63, 64), neuroscience and
evolutionary biology (65–67), economics (68–70), and political
science (3, 33, 34, 71–74). Transfers in these games predict a
wide range of real world behavior (75, 76), including turnout
(77), charitable donations (78), and propensity to repay loans
(79). In our study, behavioral games are valuable because they
allow us to observe choices made by both winners and losers in
the same environment.
To measure reciprocity, we combine a Trust Game and a Dic-
tator Game. The Trust Game begins with two players, both
endowed with 5,000 Zambian Kwacha (about 2.5 h of wages for our
median participant). The two players are matched randomly and
anonymously, and they are in different rooms, so that no player
knows the identity of her partner. In stage 1, player 1 may transfer
any amount of her initial endowment to player 2, and this transfer
is tripled before the second player receives it. In stage 2, the tripled
transfer is added to player 2’s initial endowment, and player 2 may
return any nonnegative amount of the total to player 1.
In the Dictator Game, two players are matched randomly and
anonymously with a different person in the other room. The
Dictator Game has the same endowment and choice structure as
Trust Stage 2. The subjects of our experiments played the Dictator
Game after the Trust Game, with several tasks in between. In both
games, the rules (the actions, payoffs, and information available to
both players) are common knowledge to both players.
In our experiments, we fixed each player’s monetary endow-
ment in the Dictator Game to be identical to that in Trust Stage
2. Thus, the only difference between these two tasks is an implicit
framing of reciprocity. In Trust Stage 2, the subject knows that
an anonymous and randomly assigned partner in another room
determined her endowment. In the Dictator Game, she knows
that the researcher determined her endowment. We develop an
indicator of reciprocity by taking the difference between a sub-
ject’s transfer in Trust Stage 2 and the Dictator Game and di-
viding it by her endowment (which is constant across these tasks).
We call this the “reciprocity score,” representing reciprocal be-
havior after removing the generosity component (3, 4). The
“trust score” is the amount transferred in Trust Stage 1 by player
1 (divided by player 1’s endowment), a measure of how willing
a politician is to send money to another individual without
knowing whether she will reciprocate. The “generosity score” is
the amount transferred in the Dictator Game (divided by en-
dowment), a measure of how willing a politician is to give some-
thing to another individual without the perceived obligation of
reciprocity. Fig. 1 shows the distribution of these three variables:
the trust score, the generosity score, and the reciprocity score.
Although existing literature provides a clear prediction for the
effect of holding office on reciprocity scores, it does not provide
predictions for generosity or trust scores (behavior in the Dictator
and Trust Stage 1 tasks, respectively). Political scientists generally
model politicians as self-interested, and therefore, we might
†An earlier paper drew heavily on one thread of the corruption literature that argues the
acquisition of power reduces prosocial behavior (47–49, 57, 58). We therefore expected
office holders to share less of their earnings in the second stage of the Trust Game. We
have since reconsidered the theoretical foundations of our argument to focus on
broader applications of reciprocity. Despite differences in framing regarding the effect
of holding office on behavior, every version of this paper uses exactly the same data,
models, and tests.
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expect generosity and trust, which are economically irrational in
equilibrium, to be low among our participants. However, whereas
political scientists describe legislative institutions as fostering
reciprocity, we are not aware of any works arguing that these in-
stitutions foster or suppress generosity or trust, meaning that this
literature does not lead us to believe that the experience of
holding office should cause close winners to differ systematically
from close losers. In addition, although our interviewees de-
scribed reciprocity as a crucial trait for officials, they said nothing
of trust or generosity, validating our lack of focus on the trust
score and generosity score effects.
Analysis
We had a unique opportunity to use behavioral experiments to
test the effect of office holding in Zambia. With the endorsement
of the Local Government Association of Zambia, we invited 346
politicians who had run for district council in the most recent
election and won or lost by 10%. We were able to recruit 143 of
346 politicians (41%) from all over Zambia to a conference
center in Lusaka to participate in our research. District councils in
Zambia consist of 8–28 councilors who control an average budget
of about $500,000 or 326 times Zambia’s income per capita—
enough money that council decisions can significantly affect the
daily lives of citizens. When councilors build coalitions with their
peers to pass policy, they face little oversight from any other level
of government (80, 81). In brief, district councilors in Zambia
make choices important to the welfare of their constituents
without extensive institutional constraints.
We used an electoral RDD to identify individuals who could
serve in treatment and control groups for the treatment of
holding political office. This design works because at the elec-
toral margin winners and losers are indistinguishable but for the
fact of having obtained office. (SI Appendix has discussion of this
technique and evidence that our two groups were, in fact, bal-
anced across 24 covariates.) We drew our subjects from the pool
of Zambian political elites who ran for district council and won
or lost by 10% or less. This recruitment strategy essentially
“hard-coded” our chosen bandwidth for analysis, preventing us
from manipulating the bandwidth to obtain significant results.
Following recent literature on RDDs (82), we use a linear
model to identify the effect of office holding on reciprocity:
yi = β0 + β1Ti + β2Vi + «:
Here, the treatment Ti is a dummy variable indicating whether
subject i holds office; the dependent variable yi is the reciprocity
score, and the forcing variable Vi is the margin of victory. There
are small amounts of data missing because of subjects using the
restroom or taking urgent telephone calls. Winners and losers
were equally likely to miss experimental tasks, so even if this
missingness is nonrandom with respect to reciprocity, it would
not bias our findings unless the correlation between reciprocity
and missingness were different for winners and losers.
Results
We find that holding office significantly affects the behavior of
politicians. As expected, there is a significant effect of holding
office on reciprocity scores. The results of our regressions appear
in Table 1.‡ Fig. 2 depicts graphically the discontinuity in reci-
procity score at the cut point using Epanechnikov kernel-weighted
local mean estimation.
We do not find a behavioral effect of holding office on trust or
generosity scores, which aligns with the literature cited above
that focuses on reciprocity rather than trust or generosity. These
null effects show that holding office does not cause politicians to
trust anonymous partners more or sacrifice for the sake of fairness
or generosity. Together with the positive effect on reciprocity,
these results show that office holding seems to train officials in the
norm of “you scratch my back, I scratch yours,” but it does not
condition them to initiate the exchange or give without the
perceived obligation of reciprocity.
We recruited only individuals close to the cutoff, and we de-
termined our estimation technique before we entered the data,
so the typical concern with RDDs—that the researcher might
choose a bandwidth and model specification to obtain a signifi-
cant result—is not applicable to this case. Also, Fig. 2 illustrates
graphically that the regression discontinuity does not depend on
values far from the cut point.
We perform a number of robustness checks using alternative
model specifications (details are in SI Appendix). Our model is
robust to the inclusion of an interaction term between the
treatment and forcing variable (victory status and vote share,
respectively). Gelman and Imbens (82) argue that it is not nec-
essary (or even appropriate) to include higher-order polynomial
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Fig. 1. Histogram of trust, generosity, and reciprocity scores.
‡The sample size in these regressions is 95. As explained in Materials and Methods, we
recruited 143 individuals but excluded from the analysis 18 individuals who failed the
comprehension quizzes. Of the remaining 125 individuals, we are unable to compute a
reciprocity score for 30, because they could not complete the Dictator Game for reasons
unrelated to subject characteristics or choices in the games. (On 1 d, there was a logistical
issue at the hotel where we ran the experiment, which prevented us from reaching the
end of our protocol.)
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functions of the forcing variable, but in the interest of trans-
parency, we include models with up to third-level polynomials
with and without interaction terms. (The treatment effect of
holding office on reciprocity is significant when we add a qua-
dratic term but not a cubic term.)
As another robustness check, we stack the Dictator and Trust
Games player 2 choices to examine how playing the Trust Game
compared with the Dictator Game might affect office holders
differently. This model supports our finding; office-holding pol-
iticians give a significantly higher percentage of their endowment
than nonoffice holders in the second stage of the Trust Game but
not the Dictator Game, whereas election losers behave consis-
tently across these two tasks. The results also hold when we use
subjects’ second-stage transfers in the Trust Game (controlling
for endowment) as the dependent variable—a slightly different
operationalization of reciprocity, one that bundles quid pro quo
reciprocity and generosity. Finally, when we include participants
who scored poorly on comprehension quizzes, the estimated
treatment effect is unchanged, but the P value slightly increases,
supporting our expectation that including subjects who do not
understand the task is equivalent to adding stochastic noise.
Discussion
The results provide evidence that the experience of holding of-
fice changes behavior. More specifically, our findings show that
office-holding politicians exhibit more reciprocity than those who
ran for office but lost the election. This finding and the null
findings for trust and generosity align with the political science
literature that claims that adherence to the norm of reciprocity is
critical for success in politics and that the failure to reciprocate
trust is a greater transgression than the failure to trust. As in
gambling, the penalty for welching is greater than the penalty for
refusing to play. Future research can continue to unpack the
relationships between diverse behavioral traits and the treatment
of holding elected office.
The RDD identification strategy allows us to claim that the
difference in behavior associated with holding office is not likely
attributable to chance or confounding differences between our
treatment and control groups. Although interview data suggest
that the effect of holding office on reciprocity would be unaffected
by the size of the electoral win, we note that our findings may not
generalize to all elections and officials.
Our study indicates a causal relationship between holding of-
fice and reciprocity, and a number of different mechanisms may
be driving this result. As discussed above, interviewed Zambian
officials point to party discipline, political culture, and income as
possible mechanisms. Although some respondents stated that
parties encourage the adherence to behavioral norms among
office holders, party discipline in Zambia is actually very low (83),
which may suggest that this mechanism is likely weakest in
explaining our result. The explanation that elected officials ob-
serve and emulate a culture of reciprocity after they are in office
(political culture) is more plausible and more consistent with
existing research (46, 53).
Beyond those suggested by Zambian interview subjects, other
causal mechanisms may be at play as well. Holding office may
stimulate the reciprocity of Zambian legislators in the style of
“big man” politics prevalent in Africa (84). Alternatively, gaining
office may cultivate within Zambian district councilors a feeling
of kinship toward the citizens in their district, causing elected
officials to express a higher level of reciprocity toward their
constituents (85–87). Again, however, considering that the players
of the study’s games were members of lower-funded and consti-
tutionally constrained district councils, the view that holding office
leads to an ennobling effect that increases reciprocity may not be
persuasive (35, 85). Disentangling these mechanisms is an ave-
nue for future research.
In each task, subjects in our experiments were told that they
were paired with “another person.” We described their partners
using this neutral, anonymity-preserving language for three rea-
sons: (i) we did not want to create experimenter demand by using
loaded descriptors, such as “fellow politician”; (ii) the existing
literature showing the external validity of behavioral games
draws from games with anonymous pairing and neutral framing;
and (iii) we were not solely interested in politicians’ behavior
toward their peers. (SI Appendix elaborates on these three
points.) For all of these reasons, we felt that maintaining the
anonymity of subjects’ partners would increase our ability to
learn from the study theoretically. In future research, random-
izing the identity of subjects’ partners could provide insight as to
whether reciprocity is cultivated through particular relationships
or attitudes toward a specific class of people.
By constructing an experiment that allows us to measure ob-
servable behavior among office holders and nonoffice holders
and creates a valid counterfactual group for comparison with
office holders, our research presents an empirical contribution
toward a better understanding of the origins of the behavior of
elected officials. More specifically, we view our results as com-
pelling evidence that holding office does indeed change the be-
havioral tendencies of those in elected office, specifically by
increasing their reciprocity. Finding an effect of holding office on
behavior in this research context is intriguing; if holding even a
lower-level legislative office in a weakly institutionalized country
can change an individual’s behavior, the potential behavioral
effects of holding office at higher levels of responsibility and in
stronger political systems may be even greater. Furthermore, al-
though our measure of reciprocity did not allow for repeat in-
teraction or the possibility of sanctions, office holders in our study
Fig. 2. Discontinuity in reciprocity scores across the electoral victory margin.
Epanechnikov kernel-weighted local mean estimation with 95% confidence
intervals (95% CIs).
Table 1. Regression results
Variables Trust Generosity Reciprocity
Winner −0.128 (0.140) 0.009 (0.115) 0.356** (0.171)
Margin 0.177 (1.253) −0.524 (1.030) −2.211 (1.529)
Constant 0.488*** (0.079) 0.204*** (0.066) −0.081 (0.098)
Observations 122 97 95
R2 0.021 0.008 0.050
Adjusted R2 0.005 −0.013 0.029
P values are noted (**P < 0.05; ***P < 0.01).
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were nonetheless poised and ready to engage in reciprocal ex-
changes. As a policy implication, this paper provides evidence that
behavioral traits can be cultivated (or repressed) in political
leaders. To shape political outcomes, policymakers can address
the institutions, culture, and incentives of office holding in addi-
tion to or perhaps, instead of addressing how leaders are selected.
Materials and Methods
Themethods used in this study include fourmajor elements: (i) researchdesign, (ii)
recruitment procedures, (iii) experimental protocols, and (iv) subject compre-
hension of instructions [the following information is also available: replication R
code (Dataset S1), replication Stata code (Dataset S2), the dataset for replicating
regression results (Dataset S3), the dataset for replicating covariate balance
(Dataset S4), and discussion of additional analysis and methods (SI Appendix)].
First, we use an RDD as an assignment mechanism for the treatment of
holding office, allowing us to identify at the electoral margin the treatment
effect of holding office on strategic choices. This design determined our
population of interest—politicians who narrowly won or lost council elec-
tions. The forcing variable in our RDD is margin of victory in the last district
government election, and we recruited candidates in a bandwidth of ±10%.
In SI Appendix, we provide an overview of the literature on RDDs using
elections and argue that the design is appropriate in our case, because (i)
the officials in this study do not have enough information to manipulate
their efforts to obtain a bare majority, and (ii) we have strong evidence that
the election was free and fair (88).
In the typical RDD, the analyst has observational data for cases along the
entire spectrum of the forcing variable and must select a bandwidth around
the cut point within which to conduct the analysis.We did not have the luxury
of using extant data to measure reciprocity; instead, we had to recruit subjects
to a conference center, wherewe could use an experiment to collect behavioral
data from which we calculated the reciprocity score. This procedure was costly,
so instead of recruiting politicians from across the full spectrum of the forcing
variable, we only recruited politicians within 10% of the electoral cut point.
Thus, we prespecified our bandwidth before data collection began and only
collected outcome data within this bandwidth.
As a result, there are no real bandwidth choices to bemade, because (ii) we
only collected data from individuals close to the cutoff, and (ii) we could not
recruit enough individuals to tighten the bandwidth without losing statis-
tical power. The first point is a virtue of our design; by hard coding the
bandwidth into the sampling procedure, we guard against post hoc ma-
nipulation of bandwidth (p hacking for results). The second point is a ne-
cessity of our design; we picked the smallest bandwidth that would allow us
to assemble a sample of politicians large enough for causal inference. Our
subject pool, although larger than any group of political elites ever recruited
for behavioral experiments, is too small to allow for meaningful robustness
checks using smaller bandwidths. However, in SI Appendix, we show cova-
riate balance between the treatment and control groups across 24 observ-
able covariates, supporting the validity of our bandwidth selection (89).
Second, we designed a recruitment procedure to draw as large and un-
biased a sample as possible from our theoretical population of interest—346
candidates who ran for district council in the 2006 Zambian elections and
won or lost by less than 10%. We sent letters endorsed by the Zambian
Government to every district council asking for assistance in locating can-
didates in this population. We then called the district commissioner or mayor
of each province, who typically gave us councilors’ telephone numbers di-
rectly. Where we could not reach a district office, we broadcasted an-
nouncements on the radio. These attempts yielded a contact rate of 43%. Of
the candidates that we contacted, 95% (143 subjects—79 winners and 64
losers) participated in the experiment. This high response rate alleviates
concerns that selection into the sample is correlated with our outcome of
interest: reciprocity.
Third, we wrote, translated, tested, and refined our experimental pro-
tocols.† We went to great lengths to run the experiments in an environment
that resembles as closely as possible the environment in which our subjects
make their political decisions (conference rooms in urban areas) and set
monetary payments in the games high enough to incentivize thoughtful
decision-making. We tested our experimental protocols with undergraduate
students in the United States and at the University of Zambia and a small
sample of politicians outside our theoretical population. The experiments
were carried out using paper and pencil. Each session had ∼20 subjects and
lasted for under 2 h. In each activity, we randomly and anonymously paired
subjects with someone in another location and reminded them of this setup
every time that they made a decision. We emphasized these points to pre-
vent their behavior from being affected by friend, familial, or tribal ties of
someone in their room. The subjects received no information that would
condition their beliefs about who this other player might be other than the
handouts provided in both English and a Zambian language, which likely
suggested to them that the players were all Zambian. We, therefore, in-
terpret the actions in the game to be representative of politicians’ choices
when playing with Zambians in general, whether politician or citizen. This
construction also implies that subjects were unable to select into different
groups or paths of the research.
Fourth, we measured subjects’ comprehension of instructions and con-
ducted our analysis after removing data from subjects who could not show
sufficient levels of understanding. We cannot draw conclusions about a
subject’s behavior if he is acting under some unknown, mistaken belief about
the incentives that he faces (90). To measure comprehension, subjects took a
pretest survey that evaluated their arithmetic skills, and they were frequently
quizzed on their understanding of instructions, earning money for correct an-
swers. We used quiz answers to restrict our sample to include only those subjects
who showed that they understood the rules of the games, and ultimately, we
removed 18 participants with low quiz scores, leaving a sample of 125.
We received ethical approval on this study from the institutional review
board at the University of California, San Diego, the institution of all four
authors at the time of the field research. All subjects signed an informed
consent document before participating in our research. In addition, theywere
reminded before making each decision that their choices would be anony-
mous and that wewere recording no identifying information with their data.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. We thank Robert Bond, Micah Gell-Redman, Rupal
Mehta, Adeline Lo, Nicholas Obradovich, and Amanda Robinson for sugges-
tions, and Langche Zeng for feedback on our preanalysis model specifica-
tions. Special thanks to our project manager in Zambia, Garikai Membele;
research assistants Leslie Chikuta, Ronald Kaunda, David Makondo; Maurice
Mbolela of the Local Government Association of Zambia; Peter Loloji at the
University of Zambia; and the staff at the Zambia Electoral Commission and
Office of the Auditor General. Thanks also to our US-based research assis-
tants: Alex Blanning, Shannon Colin, and Wesley Cox. This research was
supported by the National Science Foundation.
1. Cohen L, Malloy CJ (2014) Friends in high places. Am Econ J Econ Policy 6(3):63–91.
2. Carlin RE, Love GJ (2011) The politics of interpersonal trust and reciprocity: An ex-
perimental approach. Springer Science Business Media 35(1):43–63.
3. Finan F, Schechter L (2012) Vote‐buying and reciprocity. Econometrica 80(2):863–881.
4. Sobel J (2005) Interdependent preferences and reciprocity. J Econ Lit 43(2):392–436.
5. Gouldner AW (1960) The norm of reciprocity: A preliminary statement. Am Sociol Rev
25(2):161–178.
6. Jacobson S, Petrie R (2014) Favor trading in public goods provision. Exp Econ 17(3):439–460.
7. Alexander RD (1987) The Biology of Moral Systems (Aldine de Gruyter, New York).
8. Trivers RL (1971) The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Q Rev Biol 46(1):35–58.
9. McCabe KA, Smith VL (2003) Strategic analysis in games: What information do players
use? Trust & Reciprocity: Interdisciplinary Lessons from Experimental Research, eds
Ostrom E, Walker J (Russel Sage Foundation Publications, New York).
10. Schneier EV (1988) Norms and folkways in Congress: Howmuch has actually changed?
Congress and the Presidency 15(2):117–138.
11. Bratton KA, Rouse S (2011) Networks in the legislative arena: How group dynamics
affect cosponsorship. Legis Stud Q 36(3):423–460.
12. Fowler JH (2006) Connecting the Congress: A study of cosponsorship networks. Polit
Anal 14(4):456–487.
13. Tullock G (1963) General irrelevance of the general impossibility theorem. Q J Econ
81(2):256–270.
14. Hahn V, Mühe F (2009) Committees and reciprocity. Math Soc Sci 57(1):26–47.
15. Kirkland JH, Williams RL (2014) Partisanship and reciprocity in cross-chamber legis-
lative interactions. J Polit 76(3):754–769.
16. Fenno RF (1997) Learning to Govern: An Institutional View of the 104th Congress
(Brookings Institution, Washington, DC).
17. Rabin M (1993) Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. Am Econ Rev
83(5):1281–1302.
18. Martorano N (2004) Cohension or reciprocity? Majority party strength and minority
party procedural rights in the legislative process. State Polit Policy Q 4(1):55–73.
19. Weingast BR, Marshall WJ (1988) The industrial organization of congress; or, why
legislatures, like firms, are not organized as markets. J Polit Econ 96(1):132–163.
20. Shepsle KA, Weingast BR (1987) The institutional foundations of committee power.
Am Polit Sci Rev 81(1):85–104.
21. Binder SA (1997)Minority Rights, Majority Rule, Partisanship and the Development of
Congress (Cambridge Univ Press, Cambridge, UK).
22. Weingast BR (1979) A rational choice perspective on congressional norms. Am J Pol Sci
23(2):245–262.
23. Susman TM (2008) Private ethics, public conduct: An essay on ethical lobbying, campaign
contributions, reciprocity, and the public good. Stanford Law Pol Rev 19(1):10–22.
24. Cialdini RB (2010) Influence: Science and Practice (Allyn & Bacon, Needham Heights,
MA), 4th Ed.
13694 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1511501113 Enemark et al.
25. Keefer P, Vlaicu R (2008) Democracy, credibility, and clientelism. J Law Econ Organ
24(2):371–406.
26. Lemarchand R (1972) Political clientelism and ethnicity in tropical Africa: Competing
solidarities in nation-building. Am Polit Sci Rev 66(1):68–90.
27. Nichter S (2014) Conceptualizing vote buying. Elect Stud 35:315–327.
28. Tanzi V (1998) Corruption around the world: Causes, consequences, scope and cures.
IMF Surv 45(4):559–594.
29. Abbink K (2004) Staff rotation as an anti-corruption policy: An experimental study.
Eur J Polit Econ 20(4):887–906.
30. Warren ME (2004) What does corruption mean in a democracy? Am J Pol Sci 48(2):
328–343.
31. Lambsdorff JG (2008) Global Corruption Report 2008: Corruption in the Water Sector
(Transparency International and Cambridge Univ Press, Cambridge, UK).
32. Lambsdorff JG (2007) The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform (Cam-
bridge Univ Press, Cambridge, UK).
33. Lambsdorff JG (2012) Behavioral and experimental economics as a guidance to an-
ticorruption. New Advances in Experimental Research on Corruption, eds Serra D,
Wantchekon L (Emerald Group Publishing, Bingley, UK), pp 279–300.
34. Abbink K, Serra D (2012) Anticorruption policies: lessons from the lab. New Advances
in Experimental Research on Corruption, eds Serra D, Wantchekon L (Emerald Group
Publishing, Bingley, UK), pp 77–116.
35. Rothstein B (2013) Corruption and social trust: Why the fish rots from the head down.
Soc Res (New York) 80(4):1009–1032.
36. Keohane RO (1986) Reciprocity in international relations. Int Organ 40(1):1–27.
37. Keohane RO (2001) Governance in a partially globalized world. Am Polit Sci Rev 95(1):
1–13.
38. Bagwell K, Staiger RW (2001) Reciprocity, non-discrimination and preferential
agreements in the multilateral trading system. Eur J Polit Econ 17(2):281–325.
39. Paris F, Ghei N (2003) The role of reciprocity in international law. Cornell Int Law J
36:93.
40. Simmons B (2010) Treaty compliance and violation. Annu Rev Polit Sci 13:273–296.
41. Rhodes C (1989) Reciprocity in trade: The utility of a bargaining strategy. Int Organ
43(2):273–299.
42. Bagwell K, Staiger RW (2015) Delocation and trade agreements in imperfectly com-
petitive markets. Res Econ 69(2):132–156.
43. Riker WH (1962) The Theory of Political Coalitions (Yale Univ Press, New Haven, CT).
44. McKelvey R (1976) Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some im-
plications for agenda control. J Econ Theory 12(3):472–482.
45. Tullock G (1981) Why so much stability? Public Choice 37(2):189–202.
46. Asher HB (1973) The learning of legislative norms. Am Polit Sci Rev 67(2):499–513.
47. Anderson C, Jennifer BL (2002) The experience of power: Examining the effects of
power on approach and inhibition tendencies. J Pers Soc Psychol 83(6):1362–1377.
48. Kipnis D (1972) Does power corrupt? J Pers Soc Psychol 24(1):33–41.
49. DeCelles KA, DeRue DS, Margolis JD, Ceranic TL (2012) Does power corrupt or enable?
When and why power facilitates self-interested behavior. J Appl Psychol 97(3):681–689.
50. Butler DM, Kousser T (2015) How do public goods providers play public goods games?
Legis Stud Q 40(2):211–240.
51. Hafner-Burton EM, LeVeck BL, Victor DG, Fowler JH (2014) Decision maker prefer-
ences for international legal cooperation. Int Organ 68(4):845–876.
52. Milner HV, Nielson DL, Findley MG (2016) Citizen preferences and public goods:
Comparing preferences for foreign aid and government programs in Uganda. Rev Int
Organ 11(2):219–245.
53. Reiser M, Hülsken C, Schwarz B, Borchert J (2011) Das reden der neulinge und andere
sünden. parlamentarische sozialisation und parlamentskultur in zwei Deutschen
landtagen. Z Parlamentsfragen 42(4):820–834.
54. Chikulo BC (2014) Decentralization reforms in Zambia 1991-2010. J Soc Sci 40(1):
95–105.
55. Nakagawa H (2013) Three Essays on Development Economics. Available at https://
escholarship.org/uc/item/82h5j3p6. Accessed October 25, 2016.
56. Ermisch J, Gambetta D (2016) Income and trustworthiness. Sociol Sci 3:710–729.
57. Klitgaard R (1988) Controlling Corruption (Univ of California Press, Berkeley, CA).
58. Rothstein B, Eek D (2009) Political corruption and social trust: An experimental ap-
proach. Ration Soc 21(1):81–112.
59. Shariff AF, Norenzayan A (2007) God is watching you: Priming God concepts increases
prosocial behavior in an anonymous economic game. Psychol Sci 18(9):803–809.
60. Keysar B, Converse BA, Wang J, Epley N (2008) Reciprocity is not give and take:
Asymmetric reciprocity to positive and negative acts. Psychol Sci 19(12):1280–1286.
61. Rigdon M, Ishii K, Watabe M, Kitayama S (2009) Minimal social cues in the dictator
game. J Econ Psychol 30(3):358–367.
62. Sloane S, Baillargeon R, Premack D (2012) Do infants have a sense of fairness? Psychol
Sci 23(2):196–204.
63. Marlowe FW (2004) What explains Hadza food sharing? Socioeconomic Aspects of
Human Behavioral Ecology, ed Alvard M (Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Bingley,
UK), pp 69–88.
64. Henrich J, et al. (2006) Costly punishment across human societies. Science 312(5781):
1767–1770.
65. Hoffman E, McCabe K, Smith VL (1996) Social distance and other-regarding behavior
in dictator games. Am Econ Rev 86(3):653–660.
66. Andreoni J, Versterlund L (2001) Which is the fairer sex? Gender differences in al-
truism. Q J Econ 116(1):293–312.
67. Israel S, et al. (2009) The oxytocin receptor (OXTR) contributes to prosocial fund al-
locations in the dictator game and the social value orientations task. PLoS One 4(5):
e5535.
68. Frey BS, Bohnet I (1995) Institutions affect fairness: Experimental investigations. J Inst
Theor Econ 151(2):286–303.
69. Bardsley N, Moffatt PG (2007) The experimetrics of public goods: Inferring motiva-
tions from contributions. Theory Decis 62(2):161–193.
70. Whitt S, Wilson RK (2007) The dictator game, fairness and ethnicity in postwar Bosnia.
Am Pol Sci 51(3):655–668.
71. Fowler JH (2005) Altruistic punishment and the origin of cooperation. Proc Natl Acad
Sci USA 102(19):7047–7049.
72. Glaeser E, Laibson D, Scheinkman J, Soutter C (2000) Measuring trust. Q J Econ 115(3):
811–846.
73. Bowles S, Gintis H (2002) Homo reciprocans. Nature 415(6868):125–128.
74. Robinson AL (February 26, 2016) Nationalism and interethnic trust: Experimental
evidence from an African border region. Comp Polit Sci, 10.1177/0010414016628269.
75. Fehr E, Gächter S (2002) Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature 415(6868):137–140.
76. Baran N, Sapienza P, Zingales L (2010) Can we infer social preferences from the lab?
Evidence from the Trust Game. Working paper 10-02. (Chicago Booth Research, Hyde
Park, Chicago). Available at ssrn.com/abstract=1540137.
77. Fowler JH (2006) Altruism and turnout. J Polit 68(3):674–683.
78. Benz M, Meier S (2008) Do people behave in experiments as in the field? Evidence
from donations. Exp Econ 11(3):268–281.
79. Karlan D (2005) Using experimental economics to measure social capital and predict
financial decisions. Am Econ Rev 95(5):1688–1699.
80. Chisholm D (1989) Coordination Without Hierarchy: Informal Structures in
Multiorganizational Systems (Univ of California Press, Berkeley, CA).
81. Gibson CC, Hoffman BD (2013) Coalitions not conflicts: Ethnicity, political institutions,
and expenditure in Africa. Comp Polit 45(3):273–290.
82. Gelman A, Imbens G (2014) Why high-order polynomials should not be used in re-
gression discontinuity designs. Working paper 20405 (National Bureau of Economic
Research, Cambridge, MA). Available at www.nber.org/papers/w20405.pdf.
83. Randall V, Svåsand L (2002) Political parties and democratic consolidation in Africa.
Democratization 9(3):30–52.
84. Diamond L (2008) The rule of law versus the big man. J Democracy 19(2):138–149.
85. Price TL (2003) The ethics of authentic transformational leadership. Leadersh Q 14(1):
67–81.
86. Drazen A, Ozbay EY (2016) Does “being chosen to lead” induce non-selfish behavior?
Experimental evidence on reciprocity. Discussion paper DP11338 (Centre for Economic
Policy Research, London). Available at www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/
dp.php?dpno=11338.
87. Burns JM (1978) Leadership (Harper & Row, New York).
88. Caughey DM, Sekhon JS (2011) Elections and regression discontinuity design: Lessons
from close U.S. house races, 1942-2008. Polit Anal 19(4):385–408.
89. Eggers AC, Fowler A, Hainmueller J, Hall AB, Snyder JM (2014) On the validity of the
regression discontinuity design for estimating electoral effects: New evidence from
over 40,000 close races. Am J Pol Sci 59(1):259–274.
90. Chou E, McConnell M, Nagel R, Plott C (2009) The control of game form recognition in
experiments: Understanding dominant strategy failures in a simple two person
‘guessing’ game. Exp Econ 12(2):159–179.
Enemark et al. PNAS | November 29, 2016 | vol. 113 | no. 48 | 13695
PO
LI
TI
CA
L
SC
IE
N
CE
S
